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This paper deals with interest rate differentials between U.S. dollar
denominated assets and Mexican peso denominated assets. In particular,
the paper examines to what extent transaction costs can account for
deviations from interest rate parity.
In section 10.2, I compare two propositions concerning the rela-
tionships between interest rate differentials and other economic vari-
ables. One of them is the Fisher hypothesis that relates the differential
with the expected rate of change in the spot exchange rate. The other is
the interest parity theorem that relates the differential with the forward
premium or discount on foreign exchange. The connection between these
propositions and the problems in testing the Fisher hypothesis for the
Mexican peso are also discussed. In section 10.3,1 restate the condition
for covered interest arbitrage in the presence of transaction costs. I also
discuss the availability of data and the procedure followed to estimate the
transaction costs in the foreign exchange market. In section 10.4, I
analyze the empirical evidence on covered interest arbitrage between
U.S. dollar and Mexican peso denominated assets for the period from
July 1979 to December 1980. The results show that only a small percent-
age of the deviations from parity can be accounted for by the transaction
costs as previously measured. Then I examine two possible explanations.
One of them is associated with additional costs and obstacles found in
carrying out forward transactions. The other one is associated with the
exchange gains tax treatment. Some concluding remarks are contained in
section 10.5.
Jose Saul Lizondo is a professor at Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico.
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10.2 The Fisher Hypothesis and Covered Interest Arbitrage
The Fisher hypothesis states that nominal interest rate differentials
between assets that are identical in all respects except for the currency of
denomination can be explained by the expected change in the spot
exchange rate between those currencies over the holding period (Fisher
1930). Let St be the spot exchange rate at time t, defined as the domestic
currency price of foreign currency; let it and if be one-period nominal
interest rates at time t on domestic and foreign currency denominated
assets, respectively; and let Et(X) denote the expected value of the
variable X, conditional on all the information available at time t. The
Fisher hypothesis may then be formally written as:
(1) (1 + it) = Et(St+l)
(1 +1*) St
The interest parity theorem states that short-term capital movements
will ensure that the returns on assets that are identical in all respects
except for the currency of denomination will be equal when expressed in
terms of the same currency after covering the exchange risk in the
forward exchange market. This establishes a relationship between
nominal interest rate differentials and the forward premium (or discount)
on foreign exchange. Let Ft be the one-period forward exchange rate at
time t. The condition for interest parity may then be formally written as:
(2)
 (
1 + it) = EL
(1 + /*) St
From equations (1) and (2), it is clear that the Fisher hypothesis and the
interest parity theorem are not equivalent unless the forward exchange
rate at time t is equal to the expected value at time t of the spot exchange
rate that will prevail at time t + 1. That is, both propositions are equiva-
lent only if
(3) Ft = Et{St+l).
There are theoretical reasons that lead us to believe that equation (3)
does not necessarily hold. Several models (Grauer, Litzenberger, and
Stehle 1976; Stockman 1978; Frankel 1979; Fama and Farber 1979; Roll
and Solnik 1979) imply that, under uncertainty, the forward rate is in
general different from the expected value of the future spot rate. That
difference may be the result of the existence of a risk premium. This
premium depends on people's attitudes toward risk and some characteris-
tics of the probability distributions of the variables included in the model.
Moreover, even under risk neutrality, the forward rate may be different
from the expected value of the future spot rate. This is because of the
presence of a convexity term that arises from Jensen's inequality and the223 Interest Differential and Covered Arbitrage
probability distribution of some of the variables included in the model.
Jensen's inequality establishes that the expected value of a convex func-
tion of a random variable is larger than the value of the function evalu-
ated at the expected value of the random variable. This implies that if the
forward rate is equal to the expected value of the future spot rate from the
domestic point of view, then they are not equal from the foreign point of
view. This implication is known as the Siegel paradox, but it is thought to
be of no empirical significance (Siegel 1972; McCulloch 1975).
Even when the implication of several models is that in general the
forward rate is different from the expected value of the future spot rate,
there are some conditions under which the same models imply that they
are equal. Therefore, the validity of equation (3) is an empirical matter.
Given that Et(St+i) is not an observable variable, empirical work on this
subject has tested the validity of equation (3) jointly with the hypothesis
of market efficiency (Geweke and Feige 1979; Hansen and Hodrick
1980). If equation (3) holds and the market is efficient, the forward
exchange rate should be the best forecast of the future spot rate. The tests
are concerned both with whether the forward rate is an unbiased forecast
of the future spot rate and with whether there is any other information
that can be used to generate better predictions of the future spot rate. The
information set generally includes past values of the forecast error for the
same exchange rate and forecast errors from other currencies. Sometimes
the hypothesis that the forward rate is the best forecast of the future spot
rate is considered independently of its implications for market efficiency
(Bilson 1980), but the results of the tests are nevertheless relevant for that
issue.
The results of the tests tend to reject the joint hypothesis of market
efficiency and the condition expressed in equation (3). If equation (3)
does not hold, the Fisher hypothesis is different from the condition for
interest parity. Therefore, there are reasons to test the empirical validity
of each of them separately.
To test the Fisher hypothesis is to test whether equation (1) holds.
Here, the same problem that was found in testing the validity of equation
(3) is present: Et(St+i) is not an observable variable. This problem is
circumvented by testing the Fisher hypothesis jointly with the hypothesis
of market efficiency (Cumby and Obstfeld 1980). If equation (1) holds
and the market is efficient,
[(1 + ir)/(l + i*))St
should be the best forecast of the future spot rate. In particular, the
forecast error should have zero mean and should be uncorrelated at all
lags. The results of empirical work on this subject suggest that the Fisher
hypothesis does not hold under the assumption of market efficiency.
The procedures used to test equations (1) and (3) are not adequate224 Jose Saul Lizondo
when studying currencies under fixed exchange rates when there is a
positive and small probability of a large change in the exchange rate,
either by devaluation or revaluation. The consequences of the existence
of a positive and small probability of a drastic event has already been
studied (Krasker 1980; Lizondo 1980). Also, when discussing the possible
explanations for the rejection of the efficiency hypothesis in their works,
Hansen and Hodrick (1980) say:
Even though economic agents may process information optimally, the
correct stochastic specification of government actions may not be con-
sistent with the statistical model underlying our test. For instance, if
economic agents correctly perceive that governmental actions will be
roughly constant over relatively long periods and yet may change
dramatically either at uncertain points in time or by an uncertain
magnitude, we conjecture that it is possible that the statistical proce-
dure we employ might yield sample autocorrelations in forecast errors
that are large relative to their estimated standard errors even if the
simple efficiency hypothesis is true. The cause of this could be a
combination of incorrect assumptions we have made in determining
the asymptotic covariance matrix for our estimators, a small sample
size relative to the movements in government policy variables, and the
inappropriateness of an ergodicity assumption in an environment
where agents may assign positive a priori probabilities to events that
may ultimately never occur.
These warnings are especially important when analyzing the validity of
equation (3) under fixed exchange rates. For instance, assume that the
level of the spot rate is equal to So. Also assume that, at time t, there is a
positive and small probability Pt of a devaluation, between t and t+1,
that will set the exchange rate at a new level So (1 + a) with a > 0. Assume
that investors are risk neutral, that they know Pt and a, and that the
market is efficient. Under those conditions, equation (3) holds and
As long as the devaluation does not take place, the forecast error,
is positive. In other words, the forward rate consistently overestimates
the future spot rate and there seems to be a positive bias. Moreover, there
is reason to believe that Pt is a variable with positive autocorrelation. The
reason is that, in general, the variables that determine Pt, such as the level
of international reserves and political stability, are themselves positively
autocorrelated. Then, if yesterday's probability of a devaluation was
relatively high but it did not take place, today's probability of a devalua-
tion will tend to be relatively high too. In that case, the forecast error will
show positive autocorrelation. Therefore, as long as the devaluation does225 Interest Differential and Covered Arbitrage
not take place, the results of the usual tests will reject the joint hypothesis
of market efficiency and equation (3), even when it is true.
It is also interesting to note that if the devaluation takes place between
t + k — 1 and t + k, the forecast error,
et+k — Ft + k-l ~ $t + k — So
a(Pt + k-l ~~ 1) >
will be negative, unless Pt+k-1 = \, which is very unlikely. In other
words, for that period the forward rate will seem to have underestimated
the future spot rate. These implications are consistent with the experi-
ence of the Mexican peso during the period prior to the devaluation of
August 1976.
Even though Mexico has not formally had a fixed parity since Septem-
ber 1976, the exchange rate has been relatively constant since March 1977
and the peso has always been quoted at a discount on the forward market.
This suggests that the problems of the bias and the autocorrelation
mentioned above may have been always present.
Table 10.1 presents some information about the series of forecast
errors et = Ft_l - St. The series consists of forty-three nonoverlapping monthly observations for the period from May 1977 to December 1980
using bid rates. The series has a positive mean, and only two of the
observations are negative. It also shows positive autocorrelations at the
first lags. A first order autoregressive model was estimated for the series.
The results show a significant positive constant and a significant first
order autoregressive parameter. The specific model estimated for the
series is less important than the general conclusions that the forward rate
seems to have consistently overestimated the future spot rate and that the
forecast error shows significant positive autocorrelations.
These types of results are generally used to reject the joint hypothesis
of market efficiency and the validity of equation (3). As was mentioned










































Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. Monthly nonoverlapping observa-
tions for the period May 1977 to December 1980. The S, and Ft are bid rates. Spot rates are
9 AM New York time quotations, and forward rates are 12 AM New York time quotations.
The source of data of exchange rates is the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.226 Jose Saul Lizondo
these results should not be interpreted in that way because they are also
consistent with market efficiency and equation (3). In other words, these
results do not help us test equation (3) for the Mexican peso.
The same reasoning applies to equation (1). Under fixed exchange
rates and positive probability of a devaluation, if the market is efficient
and equation (1) holds, the domestic interest rate will reflect the expected
devaluation. As long as the devaluation does not take place,
will overestimate the future spot rate, and the forecast error is likely to
show positive autocorrelation. Nevertheless, this reasoning assumes that
domestic interest rates are free to adjust, reflecting the expected devalua-
tion. This is not the case in Mexico. Interest rates on peso-denominated
time deposits are officially determined, and returns on Mexican treasury
bills are regulated through open market operations. In this case, we do
not even have a strong presumption about the characteristics of the series
of forecast errors
<?,= [(1 +i,_!)/(l +/,*_!)]$,_! -S,.
Table 10.2 presents information on that series. The series consists of
forty-three nonoverlapping monthly observations for the period from
May 1977 to December 1980. Exchange rates are bid rates, and interest
rates are after-tax rates on time deposits. The series has a positive mean,
and nine of the observations are negative. It also shows a small positive
autocorrelation at the first lag. A first order autoregressive model was
estimated for the series.
The results show a significant positive constant and a first order autore-
Table 10.2





































Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. Monthly nonoverlapping observa-
tions for the period May 1977 to December 1980. The St are bid rates. The it and i* are
after-tax rates on Mexican peso and dollar time deposits, respectively, for Mexican deposi-
tors. The source of exchange rate data is described in table 10.1. Interest rates on dollar
deposits are Eurodollar opening rates in London collected from Reuters news service.
Interest rates on Mexican peso deposits were taken from "Indicatores Economicos," Banco
de Mexico, S.A.227 Interest Differential and Covered Arbitrage
gressive term that is not significant at the 5 percent level. The positive
constant indicates that
overestimated the future spot rate for the period considered.
Nevertheless, the extent of the overestimation is considerably smaller
than the one found when using the forward rate to predict the future spot
rate. Given that interest rates are regulated, these results do not imply
that interest rates reflect the expected devaluation better than forward
exchange rates do. On the other hand, those who believe that equation
(3) holds may interpret the results as evidence that interest rates on
Mexican peso deposits were not allowed to adjust by the full amount of
the expected depreciation.
Therefore, not only are there technical obstacles in testing the Fisher
hypothesis, there is also the issue of interpretation of the results when
interest rates are regulated. In view of these problems, I will focus on
testing the interest parity condition.
10.3 Covered Interest Arbitrage
The interest parity theory maintains that the returns on assets that are
identical in all respects except for the currency of denomination will be
equal when expressed in terms of the same currency after covering the
exchange risk in the forward exchange market. Otherwise, capital flows
would take place from the asset with the lower return to the asset with the
higher return, until changes in interest rates or changes in exchange rates
insure that equation (2) holds.
The observed deviations from the parity condition have been rational-
ized in terms of nonmonetary yields (Tsiang 1959), political risk (Aliber
1973; Doodley and Isard 1980), transaction costs (Branson 1969;
Prachowny 1970; Frenkel and Levich 1975, 1977), capital controls
(Doodley and Isard 1980), differential tax treatment (Levi 1977), and
difference between short-run and long-run relationships (Pedersson and
Tower 1979). Some of these and other explanations, like default risk and
premature repatriation, are analyzed in a survey article by Officer and
Willett (1970).
My purpose here is to analyze the deviations from interest parity
between dollar-denominated assets and peso-denominated assets. I ex-
amine to what extent transaction costs can account for those deviations,
and I also consider the effects of other factors, such as regulations on
forward market operations and exchange gains tax treatment.
The framework used is based on Frenkel and Levich (1975). It consists
of the derivation of a neutral band around the interest parity line. For
points within the band, transaction costs exceed arbitrage profits. There-228 Jose Saul Lizondo
fore, those points do not violate in a meaningful sense the condition of
equilibrium expressed in equation (2).
Frenkel and Levich consider four distinct transaction costs for a cov-
ered outflow (inflow) of capital: sale of domestic (foreign) securities,
purchase of foreign (domestic) currency spot, purchase of foreign
(domestic) securities, and sale of foreign (domestic) currency forward.
Let the costs in the foreign and domestic security markets and in the spot
and forward exchange markets be denoted by c*, c, cs, and Cf, respec-
tively, as percentages of the total transaction. The condition for profit-
able capital outflows is
(4) (i + o<|(i + i*)n',
and the condition for profitable capital inflows is
(5) ft'(i + o>|(i + r),
where ft' = (1 — c) (1 - cs) (1 — c*) (1 — Cf). This assumes that the initial
position of the arbitragers is in securities. If the initial position of arbi-
tragers is in cash ft' should be replaced by [07(1 - c)
2] in equation (4),
and by [117(1 - c*)
2] in equation (5).
Due to unavailability of data, I assume that arbitragers begin their
position with cash and that c — c*. Under those conditions, I replace ft' in
equations (4) and (5) by ft = (1 - cs) (1 - cf).
From equation (4), the lower limit on /?[/? = (F - S)/S] for which
outflows of capital are profitable is:
(6) (l
-
From equation (5), the upper limit on/? for which inflows of capital are
profitable is:
= ft(l + ,•)-(! + ,-*)
V
 }
 P (1 + *)
The neutral band is defined by equations (6) and (7). As long as/? </?</?,
arbitrage flows are not profitable. For/? </? inflows are profitable, and for
/?>/? outflows are profitable.
The empirical implementation of this problem requires the estimation
of transaction costs in the spot and forward foreign exchange markets.
Frenkel and Levich estimated those costs by studying the behavior of
triangular arbitrage. They assume that deviations from triangular arbi-
trage are due to transaction costs, and their estimates of cs and cf are the
percentages that bound 95 percent of those deviations.229 Interest Differential and Covered Arbitrage
The estimation of cs and cf by this procedure assumes that the various
exchange rates reflect a direct exchange of one currency for another.
Unfortunately, all the quotations of the Mexican peso with currencies
different from the U.S. dollar are obtained through the Mexican peso/
U.S. dollar exchange rate. Therefore, this procedure should not be
applied in the present case.
In the empirical applications, S and Frepresent midpoint rates. There-
fore, the transaction costs should be at least equal to one-half of the
bid-ask spread in the respective market. In addition to that, cs and Cf
should include other costs, such as brokerage fees. This suggests that it is
possible to estimate the transaction costs using data on bid-ask spreads.
McCormick (1979) estimated the costs of transactions in the spot
foreign exchange market using triangular arbitrage between U.S. dollars,
British pounds, and Canadian dollars. The period of estimation was April
26,1976 to October 22,1976. When using exchange rate quotations with
no time difference among them, his estimate of cs was .090 percent,
considerably smaller than the estimates of Frenkel and Levich that used
quotations with some time difference among them.
Table 10.3 presents information on the bid-ask spreads of the British
pound/U.S. dollar and the Canadian dollar/U.S. dollar exchange rates
for the same period as McCormick's estimation. The average spreads in
the spot markets were .060 percent for the British pound/U.S. dollar
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Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the maximum value of the spread when the largest
observation is deleted. The source of the data is the International Monetary Market Year-
book, 1976-1977.230 Jose Saul Lizondo
exchange rate. In view of McCormick's estimate of cs and the information
of table 10.3, I considered it a reasonable procedure to estimate the
transaction costs for the Mexican peso/U.S. dollar spot exchange as
one-half the bid-ask spread plus .06 percent.
Another question to discuss is the stability of transaction costs. The
triangular arbitrage procedure produces one estimate for the whole
period and therefore assumes that costs were stable during the period of
estimation. Nevertheless, looking at table 10.3 it is possible to see that
bid-ask spreads have large fluctuations. If other components of the costs
do not vary inversely with the spread, and I do not see any reason why
they would, one should have one estimate of the cost for each of the
observations. Therefore, for the Mexican peso I use one-half of the
bid-ask spread plus .06 percent for each of the observations. I am aware
that this is a compromise because I am still using McCormick's estimate
to justify the .06 percent above the half bid-ask spread.
For the estimation of transaction costs in the three months forward
market, McCormick assumes cy = .96941 cs for arbitrage between U.S.
dollars, British pounds, and Deutsche marks, and cy = 1.00913 cs for
arbitrage between U.S. dollars, British pounds, and Canadian dollars.
These are relationships found by Frenkel and Levich for the 1973-1975
period using the procedure of triangular arbitrage. On table 10.3, it is
possible to see that the spread in the three months forward market is
about twice the spread in the spot market. If the other components of the
cost are not lower in the forward market, and I do not see any reason why
they would be, cy should be larger than cs at least in one-half of the
differences between the bid-ask spreads of both markets. Therefore,
McCormick's procedure seems to me to be inadequate. Therefore, for
the estimation of the costs of transactions in the forward market I also
use one-half of the bid-ask spread plus .06 percent for each of the
observations.
Table 10.4 presents information on spreads in Mexican peso exchange
rates for the period for which bid and ask rates are available. It also
presents, indirectly, information about the estimates of cs and cy. The
Table 10.4 Percentage Bid-Ask Spreads in Mexican Peso























Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the maximum value of the spread when the largest
observation is deleted. The source of the data is described in table 10.1.231 Interest Differential and Covered Arbitrage
spread in the spot and the forward markets are considerably larger than
for other currencies. This may be a consequence of banks assigning a
larger risk to take positions in Mexican pesos than in other currencies and
widening the spread accordingly. The effects of uncertainty on bid-ask
spreads is theoretically considered in Allen (1977). Some empirical evi-
dence on that relationship is provided by Fieleke (1975), Aliber (1975),
and McKinnon (1976). Another interesting point to observe in table 10.4
is that the average spread in the forward market is considerably larger,
with respect to the spread in the spot market, than for the other curren-
cies. This may be a consequence of the Bank of Mexico intervening
actively in the spot market and presumably not intervening in the forward
market.
After determining the procedure to use to estimate transaction costs in
the foreign exchange market, it is necessary to consider the assets whose
returns are to be compared. Ideally, the assets should be identical in all
respects except for the currency of denomination. One important factor
to take into account is the political risk (Aliber 1973). When comparing
the returns on assets denominated in currencies of two countries, the
assets should be issued in the same financial center, that is, the same legal
jurisdiction, located in a third country. Under those conditions, it is
expected that the probability of future capital controls will affect the
returns on both assets to the same extent. The empirical evidence shows
that assets differing essentially only in their currency of denomination,
such as Eurocurrency deposits, conform with the interest parity condition
after considering the transaction costs. For the comparison of returns on
treasury bills, the transaction costs explain a considerably smaller per-
centage of the deviations from interest arbitrage (Aliber 1973; Frenkel
and Levich 1977, 1979; McCormick 1979).
For the Mexican peso we should use interest rates on deposits in
foreign banks placed in foreign countries that are not subject to Mexican
official regulations on interest rates. Unfortunately, data are not avail-
able on interest rates paid on those types of deposits. Therefore, I use
time deposits and Mexican treasury bills as peso-denominated assets. For
the dollar it does not matter whether we use Eurodollar deposits or dollar
deposits created by the Mexican banking system. The interest rates paid
on both types of deposits are the same for the period under consideration.
Finally, it is important to take into account the effect of taxes on the net
returns to investors (Levi 1977). I use the after-tax returns on the dif-
ferent assets for Mexican individuals.
10.4 Empirical Results
The period of observation is July 1979 to December 1980, for which
there is information on bid and ask exchange rates. During that period,
Mexican treasury bills were issued each week. For those days I obtained a232 Jose Saul Lizondo
series of net returns for a three-month holding period. Data on rates of
interest on three-month deposits in pesos and three-month deposits in
dollars were collected for the same dates. After deleting some observa-
tions for days on which data in some of the variables were not available,
there were seventy-five observations left. Based on the prices of the
treasury bills one month prior to their expiration, I generated a series of
net returns for a one-month holding period. Data on rates of interest on
one-month deposits in pesos and one-month deposits in dollars were
collected for the same dates. After deleting some days, there were
seventy observations left.
Using that data, I computed p and p from equations (6) and (7) for
arbitrage between Mexican peso time deposits and U.S. dollar time
deposits, and for arbitrage between Mexican treasury bills and U.S.
dollar time deposits. The results are presented in table 10.5.
The first column indicates the percentage of observations that lay
within the neutral band, that is, observations for which p<p<p. It is
possible to see that only a small proportion of the observations fall in that
category. For all the observations outside the bandp>p. This indicates
that for those observations there seems to be an opportunity for profit-
able capital outflows. The proportions of observations within the band is
larger for Mexican treasury bills than for Mexican peso time deposits.
This is the result of an official policy of keeping interest rates on time
deposits below the rates on treasury bills. This policy also gave rise to a
complaint from the commercial banks of "unfair competition" by the
government in the attraction of funds. The proportion of observations
Table 10.5 Deviations from Interest Parity Computed
































Note: Three-month returns on Mexican treasury bills were taken from "Anuario Finan-
ciero y Bursatil" 1979 and 1980, Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, S.A. de C.V. One-month
returns were calculated from a sample of prices provided by six brokerage firms. For the
sources of the other data used on this table see tables 10.1 and 10.2.
a%ONB .= Percentage of observations within the neutral band.
bNOBS = Number of observations.
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within the band is also larger for one-month assets than for three-month
assets. This may arise because in general the discount on the peso
increases substantially with the time length of the contract, and this is not
completely reflected in the time structure of interest rates on peso-
denominated assets. The second column indicates the average size of the
band, p —p. The band is wider for three-month assets than for one-
month assets, reflecting the larger spread in the three-month forward
market than in the one-month forward market. Given that for all the
observations outside the band there are incentives for capital outflows,
p >p, I computed the maximum positive deviation of/? from "complete"
parity consistent with equilibrium. Let/?* = (i - i*)/(l + i*), then "com-
plete" parity means/? = /?*. Therefore, the maximum positive deviation
of/? from complete parity consistent with equilibrium is/? - /?*. The third
column of table 10.5 provides information on that variable. Those num-
bers say, for example, that on average the one-month forward discount
on the peso needs to increase more than .44 percent above the parity line
to present opportunities for profitable capital outflows.
The results of table 10.5 indicate the presence of persistent deviations
from interest parity that provide incentives for capital outflows. This
leads us to think about the reasons why prices did not adjust to reach
equilibrium. Given that domestic interest rates and the spot exchange
rate are controlled, and that the Eurodollar rate can be considered
exogenous, the only price left to perform the adjustment is the forward
exchange rate. One explanation of the results may be the presence of
corner solutions in which we observe interest rate quotations for peso-
denominated assets that seem to be out of equilibrium, but the quantity
of those assets demanded at those prices is zero, that is, nobody is holding
peso-denominated time deposits and nobody but the central bank is
holding Mexican treasury bills. But this is not the case. Another possibil-
ity is to emphasize the difference in time for the different quotations.
Spot exchange rates are recorded at 9:00 AM New York time, forward
rates are recorded at 12:00 AM New York time, Eurodollar rates are
London opening rates, peso time deposit rates are valid for the whole
day, and Mexican treasury bill rates are daily averages. Even when there
is time difference among the quotations, it seems to me that they do not
provide a plausible explanation of the results. In particular, if time
differences were the cause of the deviations, we would expect to observe
deviations of/? above and below the band, but we only observe deviations
of/? above the band. Therefore, we have to look for other explanations of
the results. I examine two possible explanations below; one is associated
with additional costs and obstacles found in carrying out forward transac-
tions, and the other is associated with the exchange gains tax treatment.
Mexican investors with an initial position in pesos can make arbitrage
operations selling pesos, investing in dollar deposits and selling dollars234 Jose Saul Lizondo
forward. It seems that Mexican investors were actually doing all those
operations through foreign banks. Those banks were in fact creating
peso-denominated deposits located in various foreign countries, among
them were Panama and the United States. Even when there are not
records about the interest rates paid on those deposits, some sources
affirm that they were calculated as the Eurodollar deposit rate plus the
discount on the peso. Under those circumstances, we expect the parity
condition to be very robust, as it happens with Eurocurrency deposits on
other currencies. This arbitrage activity may have prompted the Bank of
Mexico in April 1980 to ask the foreign banks to abstain from performing
those operations. At the same time Mexican brokerage firms were forbid-
den to intervene directly or indirectly in those type of operations. Only
the Mexican commercial banks are allowed to perform those operations.
But there is a special regulation for forward transactions. When a com-
mercial bank sells dollars forward, the buyer must deposit in Mexican
pesos 25 percent of the value on the contract, without interest, during the
life of the contract. Given that commercial banks act as intermediaries,
they have to sell dollars in both cases, inflow of arbitrage capital and
outflow of arbitrage capital. The foregone interest on the 25 percent
deposit is an additional cost that must be borne by the arbitrager. Under
those conditions, there are incentives for capital outflows if:
(8) (l + i|
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y (1 + I*)(1 + .25I)
The additional costs in foregone interest on the 25 percent deposit
widen the neutral band. This can be checked by comparing equations (10)
and (11) with equations (6) and (7). With a wider band, the percentage of
observations within the band should rise.
Table 10.6 presents the results of the computations when using equa-
tions (10) and (11) for/? and/?, respectively. As expected, the costs of
arbitrage activity rise substantially. This is reflected in the second and
third columns. For example, under the new conditions, on average, the
one-month forward discount on the peso needs to increase more than .81235 Interest Differential and Covered Arbitrage
Table 10.6 Deviations from Interest Parity Computed

































Note: For the sources of data see table 10.5.
a%ONB = Percentage of observations within the neutral band.
bNOBS = Number of observations.
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percent above the parity line to present opportunities for profitable
capital outflows through Mexican commercial banks. Also as expected,
the percentage of observations inside the neutral band rises considerably.
As in the previous case, and for the same reasons, the percentage of
observations inside the band is larger for Mexican treasury bills than for
peso time deposits, and they are also larger for one-month assets than for
three-month assets.
It is unclear if arbitragers actually incur the additional costs of the 25
percent deposit. Sources in Mexican commercial banks affirm that the
previous deposit regulation left them out of the market, because indi-
viduals prefer to operate through foreign commercial banks located in
foreign countries to avoid the regulation. Nevertheless, the results of
table 10.6 give us an idea of the costs that arbitragers will be willing to
bear before resorting to Mexican commercial banks, that is, the costs
they will be willing to bear to circumvent the regulation.
Another factor that may partially explain the results of table 10.5 is the
exchange gains tax treatment. If there is a depreciation of the exchange
rate, holders of dollar deposits must pay taxes on the increase of the peso
value of the deposit. Therefore, holders of dollar deposits must take into
account the possible change in the exchange rate. Given that the future
value of the spot exchange rate is unknown at the time of creating a
deposit, there is uncertainty; hence, it is not formally correct to call the
operations we are considering arbitrage. Nevertheless, I will continue
using that term. Let t denote the marginal rate of taxation, and let S1
denote the value of the spot exchange rate at the time when the deposit
matures. Assume that investors are risk neutral; they are interested only
in the expected returns of their operation. Under those assumptions there
are incentives for capital outflows if:236 Jose Saul Lizondo
(12) (i + I-)<|(i + l-*)n-
There are incentives for capital inflows if:
(13) (i + on> | (l + /*) - |
For the construction of a neutral band based on these conditions, we
need to know E[(S1 - S)/S] and E[(Sj - S)/Si\. Assuming that
F= E(S1) and ignoring Jensen's inequality, we can replace those ex-
pressions by (F — S)/S and (F — S)/F, respectively. Under those assump-




There is a substantial difference between the effects of the tax on
exchange gains and the effects of the 25 percent deposit. The deposit
increases the costs for both capital inflows and capital outflows. There-
fore, p rises and p decreases, widening the band around the parity line.
This can be checked by comparing equations (10) and (11) with equations
(6) and (7). On the other hand, the tax on exchange gains increases the
costs for capital outflows while giving incentives to capital inflows. There-
fore, besides affecting the width of the band, the tax displaces the band
upward. As the comparison of equations (14) and (15) with equations (6)
and (7) indicates, p and p both increase.
Table 10.7 presents the results when equations (14) and (15) are used
to compute p and p. The value assumed for t is .55, which is the highest
marginal tax rate for individuals. The percentage of observations within
the band is larger than in table 10.5 for each of the categories, and the
band size is also larger. In this case, the observations outside the band are
distributed above and below it. That is, sometimes there seem to be
opportunities for profitable capital outflows and sometimes there seem to
be opportunities for profitable capital inflows. The opportunities for
capital outflows are present in the first part of the period, in which
domestic interest rates were relatively low. The opportunities for capital
inflows are present in the second part of the period, in which domestic
interest rates have risen considerably. Considering capital outflows, on
average, the one-month discount of the peso has to rise more than 1.34
percent above the parity line for them to be profitable.
Once again, it is not clear whether the exchange gains tax is actually
paid by holders of dollar deposits. It seems that individuals are able to
evade relatively easily the payment of the tax, but that firms are moni-237 Interest Differential and Covered Arbitrage
Table 10.7 Deviations from Interest Parity Computed
from Equations (14) and (15)
Average Average
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Note: For the sources of data see table 10.5.
a%ONB = Percentage of observations within the neutral band.
bNOBS = Number of observations.
(i + /)-(i + /*)n -_(i + i)n-(i + i*)
(l + i*)Jl-r (l + i*)-t '
tored more closely and are less able to evade it. The results of table 10.7
give us an idea of the costs that holders of dollar deposits will be willing to
bear to evade paying those taxes.
As a final exercise, I consider the case in which both regulations—the
25 percent deposit and the tax on exchange gains—are present. Under
those conditions there are incentives to capital outflows if:
(16) (1 + 0< | (1 + i*)Cl(l - .250 -
There are incentives to capital inflows if:
(17) n(l + 0
(1 + .25/)
From equations (16) and (17), and under the assumptions made pre-
viously,
= (
F (1 + . 250(1 + i*-t)
Comparing equations (18) and (19) with equations (6) and (7), it is
clear that p is larger than in the first case considered as a consequence of
both regulations: the exchange gains tax reduces the denominator, and
the 25 percent deposit increases the numerator and reduces the denomi-
nator. As previously mentioned, the effects of the two regulations work
in opposite directions on p. The 25 percent deposit reduces it and the
exchange gains tax increase it.238 Jose Saul Lizondo
Table 10.8 presents the results for the case in which both regulations
are present. The band has widened substantially and, as a result, all the
observations lie within it. Now, for example, on average it is necessary for
the one-month discount on the peso to rise more than 2.16 percent above
the parity line for capital outflows to be profitable.
10.5 Concluding Remarks
Domestic interest rates may be linked to foreign interest rates by the
Fisher hypothesis through the expected change in the exchange rate, and
by the interest parity condition through the forward exchange rate pre-
mium or discount. Under a system of fixed exchange rates it is difficult to
test the equivalence between the two propositions, and it is also difficult
to test the Fisher hypothesis itself. Even more, in the case in which
interest rates are officially regulated, interest rate differentials do not
reflect exchange rate expectations but official economic policy. Interest
parity, on the other hand, may be expected to work even with controlled
interest rates if there are no capital controls and if individuals have access
to the forward foreign exchange market.
The empirical evidence presented in this paper for the period 1979-
1980 suggests that transaction costs in the foreign exchange market
account for a small percentage of the deviations from parity. There are
several causes that may help to explain this result. Here, I examined two
of them: One is the requirement of a previous noninterest-bearing de-
posit in forward exchange operations, and the other is a tax on exchange
gains. The explicit consideration of those additional costs increases the
required deviation of the forward discount on the peso from interest
Table 10.8 Deviations from Interest Parity Computed
from Equations (18) and (19)
Average Average
%ONB
a p - p

























Note: For the sources of data see table 10.5.
a%ONB = Percentage of observations within the neutral band.
bNOBS = Number of observations.
c (i + 0 -Q(i + O(i- -250,-_ n(i + Q -(i + **)(! + -25Q i-i*
- fl(l + /*)(!-.25/) -t (1 + .25/)(l + i*-t) (1 + i239 Interest Differential and Covered Arbitrage
parity for capital outflows to be profitable. This helps us to understand
the observed deviations. Even when it is not clear if individuals actually
incur those additional costs, such costs certainly present obstacles to the
free movement of funds.
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Comment Kenneth Rogoff
Lizondo's paper achieves a significant step toward explaining and quan-
tifying the segmentation of Mexican financial markets from world finan-
cial markets. He shows explicitly how to take into account tax laws and
forward contract regulations in analyzing covered interest arbitrage be-
tween dollar time deposits (in Mexican banks) and peso time deposits or
treasury bills.
There is one confusing aspect of Lizondo's otherwise very clear analy-
sis, and most of this comment will be directed toward clarifying it.
Lizondo defines deviations from covered interest parity on the basis of
net of tax interest rates, but gross of tax capital gains on exchange rate
depreciation (see tables 10.2 and 10.5). The taxes on capital gains are
introduced only in the latter part of the paper as one major factor which
helps explain the author's definition of covered interest deviations.
1
Because these deviations only take into account the taxes on interest
income, and because peso-denominated deposits yielded a higher in-
terest rate during the sample period, the deviations are skewed in favor of
dollar assets. The deviations would be less skewed if they were based on
gross yields, or if they included capital gain taxes on dollar appreciation
against the peso. Of these two consistent definitions of covered interest
arbitrage, it would probably be better to look first at gross yields. Tax
laws and forward contract regulations could then be used to explain
deviations from zero, much as Lizondo does.
2 Some aspects of the rela-
tionship between gross of tax and net of tax covered interest parity are
developed in the analysis below. This analysis also expands on Lizondo's
observation that covered interest arbitrage can involve risk because of
taxes.
Covered interest parity is defined in equation (1) on a gross of tax basis:
(1) l + i, = Ft(l + i*)/Sn
where it and i* are the interest rates on peso-denominated Mexican bank
time deposits and dollar-denominated Mexican bank time deposits. St is
the spot rate at time t (peso/dollar), and Ft is the forward rate at time t.
Kenneth Rogoff is an economist at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Washington, D.C.
The author thanks Dale Henderson for useful suggestions. The views expressed herein
are the author's and do not represent the opinions of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
1. The size of the bounds in Lizondo's table 10.8 would be smaller if centered on a
definition of covered interest deviations which included the tax on capital gains. Inciden-
tally, the one- and three-month bounds in Lizondo's tables differ so much because the
interest rate deviations are not annualized.
2. This is really only a suggestion of an alternative way to organize the paper, since it
would lead to much the same conclusions as Lizondo's.242 Jose Saul Lizondo
The forward rate and the interest rates in equation (1) are of the same
maturity.
In equation (2), (covered) interest arbitrage is defined on a net of tax
basis for a taxpaying Mexican investor:
3
(i + i) - T/i = st+1(i + ryst + HFt - st+1) - - Ts(St+1 - St)/St -
where St +1 is the expected value of St +1 (which is not necessarily equal to the forward rate when there is a risk premium); TZ is the marginal tax rate
on interest income from peso-denominated deposits and also on the peso
value of interest income from dollar-denominated deposits; JS is the
marginal tax rate on capital gains from exchange rate depreciation; iy is
the marginal tax rate on capital gains from forward contracts; and c}> is the
quantity of dollars the investor sells forward to cover his exchange rate
risk. Because of taxes, he will not necessarily need to cover the principal
plus gross interest exactly; we will solve for the appropriate <J>* below.
The left-hand side of equation (2) represents the principal plus net
interest income obtained by placing one peso in a one-period peso-
denominated time deposit. The right-hand side of (2) represents the
after-tax peso income obtained by converting one peso into dollars and
placing it in a one-period dollar-denominated time deposit, while simul-
taneously selling cf> dollars forward. The first term on the right-hand side
represents the gross expected return from holding the dollar time deposit,
and the second term represents the gross expected return on the forward
contract. Even though the forward rate may equal the expected value of
the future spot rate, it is important to retain this term because we want to
analyze risk as well as expected return. The third term on the right-hand
side of (2) represents the expected tax on the dollar interest income. This
term is uncertain at time t due to the assumption that investors have to
pay interest income taxes on the peso value of their dollar interest
income. The fourth term represents the expected tax on the expected
appreciation of the principal. The final term represents the expected tax
on the expected capital gain or loss on the forward contract.
By choosing the size of the forward contract § appropriately, the
investor can insure himself of a riskless peso return on his dollar-
denominated asset. The appropriate cj>* is found by summing the coef-
ficients on the expected spot rate St+1 in equation (2), and setting (J> so
that this sum is zero. Performing this calculation yields
(3) 4>* = [(l-T,) + i*(l-
3. Net of tax interest arbitrage may be relevant even for an analysis of tax-avoiding
investors. Lizondo points out that the taxes may provide a measure of tax-avoidance costs.243 Interest Differential and Covered Arbitrage
The expression for net of tax covered interest arbitrage is obtained by
using equation (3) to substitute for <J>* in equation (2). It is clear from
equations (2) and (3) that covered interest arbitrage does not become
risky when taxes are introduced as long as the investor adjusts the size of
his forward contract to take the taxes into account. The covering forward
contract becomes smaller as interest income taxes and exchange rate
capital gain taxes rise, and falls as capital gain taxes on forward contracts
rise. When all three tax rates are equal, the covering forward contract <$>*
is (1 + i*)/St, which is exactly the size of the covering forward contract in
equation (1) for gross of tax interest arbitrage.
The case where the capital gain tax rates and income tax rates are all
equal is important because when T, = T^ = iy, net of tax covered interest
arbitrage, equations (2) and (3), implies gross of tax interest arbitrage,
equation (1). Thus deviations from gross of tax covered interest arbitrage
can only be attributed to taxes to the extent that marginal tax rates on
interest income and capital gains differ. Again, this result holds whether
or not the forward rate is equal to the expected value of the future spot
rate.
In conclusion, I should note that Lizondo's paper contains a useful
discussion of a number of methodological issues faced by an empirical
researcher who is trying to extract information from exchange market
data. The so-called "peso problem" is particularly relevant to the prob-
lem at hand. It is worth emphasizing that the "peso problem" refers to the
slow convergence to normality of distributions which include the small
probability of a major event. Even if the rare event (which in this case is a
sudden devaluation of the Mexican peso) occurs in the sample, problems
arise. The asymptotic, normal distribution on which most statistical tests
are based may still provide only a poor approximation to the sample
distribution unless the sample size is very large, perhaps large enough to
include many devaluations. The problems posed by Jensen's inequality
are also more likely to be significant when there is a small probability of a
major intervention.